Medical Indications
===================

Amy has a confirmed breast malignancy that, left untreated, will eventually progress and may shorten her natural lifespan. Physically, she is a good candidate for treatment, lacking any significant comorbidities or physical disabilities that would interfere with the action of chemotherapy. Systemic treatment of locally recurrent breast cancer potentially prolongs survival and palliates disease-related symptoms, but it is not curative. Instead, a sustained remission is the most reasonable outcome. Therefore, interventions with minimal toxicity are preferred in the palliative setting (NCCN, 2012).

The standard chemotherapy regimen for this type of malignancy includes an anthracycline and a taxane-based drug (NCCN, 2012). The potential harmful side effects of these agents include, but are not limited to, infection (2%--55%), bleeding (1%--17%), possible death from immunosuppression (\< 1%), congestive heart failure from cardiotoxicity (1%), peripheral neuropathy from neurotoxicity (temporary \< 80%, permanent 10%), alopecia (temporary 100%, permanent \< 1%), myalgias/arthralgias, fatigue, nausea/vomiting, diarrhea/constipation, taste/smell alteration, anorexia/weight loss, and general malaise (Micromedex, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). The health-care provider and the guardian must consider these potential negative outcomes when deciding whether or not to choose to pursue treatment.

Quality of Life
===============

Amy enjoys a high degree of independence. She goes for regular walks and remains quite active. She enjoys spending time outside in a quiet corner of the backyard. Her demeanor changes at the sight of her sister, indicating that she derives pleasure from her sister's company. She is able to feed herself and Susan remarks that, while a picky eater she really enjoys certain foods. The side effects from chemotherapy will temporarily, and possibly permanently, alter her ability to continue her daily activities.

Patient Preferences
===================

Amy's preferences cannot be verbally articulated. As she has been profoundly disabled since birth, no prior preferences regarding medical issues can be ascertained. Her nonverbal communication indicates a desire to be left alone. She clearly does not want examinations or invasive procedures. However, she permanently lacks the mental capacity to grasp the magnitude of this decision. Susan has expressed genuine concern regarding further invasive procedures, based on her postoperative experience after the previous mastectomy. If Amy develops an escalating lack of trust in her caregiver, it would make Susan's role and ability to care for her sister increasingly difficult and emotionally devastating (Jonsen, Siegler, & Winslade, 2010).

As her legal guardian, Susan is able to consent to therapy. Susan has articulated her desire to maintain Amy's quality of life, even if that means foregoing quantity. Susan has been informed of the benefits and risks of therapy.

Contextual Features
===================

Significant consideration must be given to the decision-making burden of the caregiver. Susan has already expressed concerns about her ability to care for her sister if she is further associated with painful or threatening situations. She is struggling with a life-altering, and potentially life-ending, decision for her sister. She is experiencing heightened guilt in choosing to withhold treatment. However, she is incredibly distressed at the idea of restraining her sister and forcibly giving treatment. She has no faith-based objections to medical interventions. Susan's support system includes her husband and teenage children, who are well accustomed to Amy. However, Susan remains the primary caregiver. She has no other siblings, and her parents are both deceased. Amy will continue to reside with Susan's family as long as possible.

The nursing staff in the outpatient chemotherapy infusion room has voiced concern in caring for Amy. Several members of the team refuse to restrain Amy in order to deliver care. Their concerns include being hit by the patient, the potential for an accidental needle stick, the potential for a chemotherapy spill, the potential for IV extravasation of a vesicant agent, the disruption of other patients' treatment, the increased care burden, and the emotional distress of restraining the patient against her will.

The patient advocate from the ethics department reviewed the case. She determined that Amy has an appropriate legal guardian, and therefore it was not necessary for the advocate office to be involved in the decision-making on behalf of the patient. Thus, a formal ethics committee review was not obtained.

Case Analysis
=============

A \"best interest standard\" is acceptable in this case (B. Glidewell, personal communication, July 30, 2010). Cantor (2005) defines the best interest standard as the decision or choice that is in the best interest of the patient, independent from the needs or views of the surrogate decision maker, being careful not to undervalue the simple benefits that the disabled person derives from existence. The focus is on the well-being of the patient and consistent with human dignity. This is not to be confused with a substituted judgment standard, as we have no way of knowing Amy's preference (Hui, 2008). Cantor (2005) recommends considering the degree of physical and mental suffering, the chances of recovery, the nature of the patient's interaction with her environment, the potential for regaining function, and the level of indignity associated with treatment. Coggon (2008) describes the best interest standard in the context of the Mental Capacity Act, stating \"when making decisions for those without capacity, the course of action least restrictive of a person's rights and freedoms is always to be preferred.\" From the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine (1983), the best interest standard should include the relief of suffering, the preservation of functioning, and the protection of quality of life.

Martyn (1994) describes a way of evaluating a meaningful life using caregiver interpretation. She argues that gestures, tones, and movements that may seem meaningless to the outside observer may be pertinent to discovery of how that individual experiences life. Susan has confirmed this notion of interpretation through their special relationship by recognizing Amy's pain symptoms early in the disease process. Susan believes that Amy genuinely enjoys her current lifestyle. Amy's quality of life would be temporarily and possibly permanently altered by chemotherapy. The level of fatigue associated with chemotherapy would interfere with walking and daily activities. Nausea and taste alteration would dissuade her from the foods that she enjoys. Peripheral neuropathy would change her perception of her environment and can be a permanent disability. Her level of functioning would be altered and her chance of a successful disease outcome is only approximately 50% (NCCN, 2012).

The act of participating in therapy may in itself be severely traumatizing. In order to successfully receive an infusion, she would have to be restrained either physically or chemically. This submission to receive invasive treatment may be considered cruel and unusual, violating her privacy of being. Forcing treatment that exacerbates her fears may actually constitute battery (B. Glidewell, personal communication, July 30, 2010). Restraint without consent or understanding violates Amy's dignity and thus her protected liberty.

These factors have an impact on the caregiver as well. Susan is afraid of being associated with both the traumatic experience of therapy delivery and the symptoms of treatment. Should the burden on the caregiver be a consideration in this case? Legally, there is no precedent for putting the caregiver's needs ahead of the patient's. Philosopher John Hardwig (1997) is an advocate of considering the caregiver burden in life-ending decisions. His argument requires a fairness calculation that assesses the degree of burden and sacrifice required by the third party. Not only does Susan face sacrifices of time and money, she has voiced significant mental anguish regarding treatment of her sister. In this case, the caregiver is the consenting surrogate, so her values are intrinsically woven into the decision-making process.

Legal Implications
==================

This is a case of giving life-altering treatment in a profoundly mentally disabled person unable to participate in medical decision-making. The United States Declaration of the Rights of the Disabled (section 3) states, \"Disabled persons have the right to respect for their human dignity...which implies first and foremost the right to enjoy a decent life as normal and full as possible.\" From the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, all persons are afforded equal protection under the law to include personal liberty. This extends to the right of any person to refuse medical intervention, which translates to an interest in self-determination, well-being, and bodily integrity (Cantor, 2005). Preserving bodily integrity equates to personal dignity. This concept of dignity highlights the role of autonomy in the ethics of medical treatment of the profoundly mentally disabled.

The most prolific legal statute applicable to this situation is derived from case law. The *Superintendent of Belchertown State School & another v. Joseph Saikewicz*(1976) was the case of a profoundly mentally disabled man diagnosed with acute leukemia. The question before the court was whether or not to treat him with life-prolonging chemotherapy. The justices decided to uphold \"the right of any person, competent or incompetent, to be spared the deleterious consequences of life-prolonging treatment\" (p. 745). With a focus on the patient's inability to appreciate his situation or verbalize his choice, they argued that

\"...principles of equality and respect for all individuals require conclusion that choice exists...a general right in all persons to refuse medical treatment...\[therefore\] the recognition of that right must extend to the case of an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the value of human dignity extends to both (page 745).\"

In other words, when considering the basic ethical principles applied to the practice of medicine, profoundly mentally disabled persons have a right to treatment under the auspices of equality and autonomy and the right to refuse treatment as well.

Case Resolution
===============

After considering the possible outcomes and discussing the issues with delivering therapy, Susan decides that Amy should not receive treatment. She wants Amy to continue to enjoy the life she currently leads with minimal interruption. As her terminal illness progresses, the pain associated with malignancy may begin to interfere with her current level of activity. Avoidance of suffering can be achieved by creating a plan for palliative care and eventual hospice in advance of the natural timeline of the disease (B. Glidewell, personal communication, July 30, 2010). The social worker and palliative care team have been consulted on the case. They are recommending an aggressive pain regimen and assistance in the home when Amy begins to decline. Radiation oncology has also been consulted. If Amy develops a painful bony lesion, as is common with metastatic breast cancer, she could receive a small dose of radiation for palliative pain control with minimal difficulty. The health-care team believes a good outcome is quite possible in this case and concurs with Susan's decision to withhold treatment.

Conclusion
==========

When evaluating a patient with a severe developmental disability for his or her fitness for chemotherapy, the oncology advanced practitioner should strongly consider the patient's quality of life. Utilization of their institution's advocacy office and/or an ethics committee case review can be helpful in many situtations. Inclusion of the entire care team and the patient's support system, including the primary caregiver, is paramount for a successful outcome. Always remember that the patient has both the right to be considered for treatment regardless of his or her disability and the right to not receive therapy.
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